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Objectives Knowledge of the secondary attack rate (SAR) and
serial interval (SI) of influenza is important for assessing the severity
of seasonal epidemics of the virus. To date, such estimates have
required extensive surveys of target populations. Here, we propose a
method for estimating the intrafamily SAR and SI from postings on
the Twitter social network. This estimate is derived from a large
number of people reporting ILI symptoms in them and\or their
immediate family members.
Design We analyze data from the 2012–2013 and the 2013–2014
influenza seasons in England and find that increases in the estimated
SAR precede increases in ILI rates reported by physicians.
Results We hypothesize that observed variations in the peak value
of SAR are related to the appearance of specific strains of the virus
and demonstrate this by comparing the changes in SAR values over
time in relation to known virology. In addition, we estimate SI (the
average time between cases) as 241 days for 2012 and 248 days for
2013.
Conclusions The proposed method can assist health authorities by
providing near-real-time estimation of SAR and SI, and especially in
alerting to sudden increases thereof.
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Please cite this paper as: Yom-Tov et al. (2015) Estimating the secondary attack rate and serial interval of influenza-like illnesses using social media. Influenza
and Other Respiratory Viruses 9(4), 191–199.
Introduction
Understanding the transmission dynamics of influenza and
influenza-like illnesses (ILI) is vital for deciding on public
health strategies to reduce the impact of the virus. An
important parameter in the spread of pandemic diseases is
their secondary attack rate (SAR): the probability that
infection occurs among susceptible persons within a reason-
able incubation period following known contact with an
infectious person or an infectious source.1 A further impor-
tant parameter for influenza transmission models widely
used to design control measures is the serial interval (SI): the
time between symptom onset of a primary case and symptom
onset of its secondary cases.
Collecting the necessary data for computing SAR and SI
entails the tracking of relatively large populations or
identification of cases and follow-up of their contacts and
is compounded by the fact that the majority of people
suffering from influenza do not seek medical attention. For
example, only 17% of laboratory-confirmed cases in a large
community cohort in England sought medical attention.2
Thus, periodic surveys are sometimes employed for data
collection,2 although these require a large effort by research-
ers or health authorities and the public completing them.
Public health bodies monitor influenza based on those
who seek medical attention, but this surveillance provides no
direct information on transmissibility. Some countries also
plan more detailed ascertainment of cases and their contacts
during pandemics but even these studies may have difficulty
in estimating secondary attack rates within households
because identified cases and their contacts are likely to
receive antivirals.3 Selection bias is inherent in outbreak
investigations which may also overestimate transmissibility.4
A mechanism to routinely monitor an indicator of influenza
transmissibility, such as the SAR, and of SI using standard-
ized methodology that could be used on an international
scale would therefore be an important tool to guide
pandemic response.5
Behavioral data from the Internet in general, and social
media in particular, are known to correlate well with various
health behaviors. The severity of influenza was tracked using
search engines,6 advertisements7 and social media.8 Although
the accuracy of the first of these has been criticized,9 partially
for its sensitivity to media attention to seasonal flu, it remains
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an inexpensive and near-real-time tool for monitoring
influenza load across multiple geographies.
Tracking influenza load through Internet activities pro-
vides a more sensitive sensor than that afforded by hospi-
talizations and doctor visits because it serves as a window
into people’s health concerns even when these do not
warrant a visit to medical facilities. They are also advanta-
geous over surveys because they can be collected with a much
smaller effort. The drawbacks of these data are that they
cannot be directly verified (e.g., using genetic testing for the
specific strain of the virus from which a person is suffering),
use ambiguous language, and that people sometimes over-
diagnose themselves.10 Here, we study a specific type of SAR
known as the familial or household secondary attack rate
(fSAR). fSAR is defined as the probability that at least one
household contact becomes a secondary case given that one
of the family members was infected.5 We estimate fSAR by
observing reports of influenza-like illness and its symptoms
in social media, and whether they pertain to the reporting
user themselves or to their immediate family members.
Methods
Data
Twitter data
We collected all messages from the Twitter social network,
also known as tweets, originating from England during two
periods: October 1, 2012, to April 30, 2013, and October 1,
2013, to April 30, 2014. We refer to these datasets as the
2012 and 2013 flu seasons, respectively. Tweets were
identified as originating in England if they had GPS
coordinates embedded in them, and these coordinates were
within England. A total of 80 950 393 tweets from 883 342
users were found in tweets posted during the 2012 season,
and 133 569 081 tweets from 1 230 678 users were found
for the 2013 season.
Survey data
We conducted a survey among 93 self-reported Twitter users,
recruited through the CrowdFlower crowdsourcing platform.
Self-reported age of 94% of the participants was between 18
and 44 years, and 83% were males. These data were used to
validate our hypotheses, as detailed in the Results.
Identifying illness tweets
Twitter content was filtered to identify tweets related to ILI
in a two-step process. First, we found tweets which contained
highly indicative terms. Then, we applied a predictor to
assess the probability that these tweets mentioned that a
specific person (either the account owner or a family
member) was suffering from ILI. In the following, we
describe both stages.
To identify Twitter messages that were likely related to ILI,
we constructed a large set of ILI-related terms and then
narrowed them to contain only the most informative of these
terms. We began by manually crafting a list of 36 textual
markers (or n-grams) related to or expressing symptoms of
ILI by browsing through related Web pages (on Wikipedia
and health-oriented Web sites). Then, using those markers as
a seed, we extracted a set of frequent n-grams (with n ≤ 4)
that co-occurred with them in a Twitter corpus containing
approximately 30 million Tweets published in February and
March 2014 and geo-located in the UK. Consequently, the
list of markers was expanded to a set of M = 217 n-grams.
Using the large set of terms, we constructed a linear
prediction model (using the ridge regression algorithm11) to
obtain the best correlation between the ILI rates gathered by
the Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP) and
published by Public Health England (PHE)a and the number
of times each term was mentioned in tweets during the same
time period. We then selected the 20 phrases which had the
largest weight in the model, and retained only those tweets
which contained one or more of these terms. The terms are
listed in Table 1. The correlation between the ILI rate and the
predicted ILI rate was computed using 10-fold cross-
validation12: the data were separated into 10 random
partitions of the same size. A model was built using 9 of
the partitions, and the correlation was measured for samples
in the 10th partition. This was repeated 10 times, so that the
correlation was measured once for each of the partitions.
This procedure was used so as to reduce the bias of the
estimated correlation. The average correlation (over the 10-
fold) between the ILI rate and the predicted ILI rate using
these 20 terms was 0685.
The resulting tweets could describe a specific person who
is suffering from ILI or could be related to more general
aspects of the flu, such as general observations on the fact
that some people are ill, or calls to vaccinate. Therefore, we
employed a second filter, which was aimed at identifying
tweets that stated that the person posting them or one of
their family members was suffering from ILI.
Table 1. Terms used for the first stage of tweet filtering
Bad cough Bed flu Chest infection
Chesty cough Cold flu Cough
Cough syrup Coughing Feel sick
Flu Food feel sick Headache night
Illness Man flu Shivering
Throat cough Vomit Vomiting
Waking headache Worst cough
ahttps://www.gov.uk/government/publications/annual-flu-
reports
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We constructed a training set for this classifier by randomly
selecting 1500 tweets after the first stage of filtering. These
tweets were labeled by five human assessors as to whether they
refer to the poster of the tweet, their immediate family
members, or none of the former. The assessors were recruited
from the crowdsourcing Web site CrowdFlower.
Tweets were represented through four families of attributes:
1. A vector-space model with words, word pairs, and lexical
affinities: Each phrase (word, word pair or lexical affinity)
was represented as a single attribute, and the value of that
attribute was the number of times that the phrase
appeared in the tweet. Lexical affinities13 are word pairs
within the same sentence separated by no more than five
words.
2. Whether tweets contained one of six “emoticons,” that is,
sequences of characters used to represent a smiling or a
sad face, etc.
3. Whether tweets were a reply to another tweet.
4. Whether tweets contained a hashtag.
A linear support vector machine (SVM)12 classifier with
probabilistic outputs was then trained to these data (lib-
SVM14 with default settings). The SVM algorithm finds the
best weights to give to each attribute so that a weighted sum
over the attributes will give the probability that a tweet is
referring to the poster of the tweet or their immediate family
members. The classifier was applied to all tweets after the first
stage of the filtering. The resulting probability estimates that
a tweet contains a statement on the poster of the tweet or
their family members were used as a weight in subsequent
processing (see below). The performance of the classifier is
analyzed in the Results.
Identifying family-related tweets
In order to determine the secondary attack rate, we need to
determine the probability that a user will tweet about a
family member (see Section “Changes in fSAR over the
influenza season” for details). To do so, we need to identify
tweets that refer to family members.
Some Twitter users regularly report on a variety of aspects
of life. Others use their account for specific purposes, for
example, work-related topics. To distinguish between users
who mention their immediate family members in their
tweets from those who did not, we computed how frequently
(if at all) family members were mentioned in each user’s
tweets. Tweets were identified as referring to family members
if they contained one or more of the following keywords:
“wife,” “husband,” “partner,” “hubby,” “girlfriend,” “boy-
friend,” “son,” “daughter,” or “child.”
The demographic profile of Twitter users indicates fewer
than 10% of users are under 18 years of age.b Therefore, we
did not include words related to parents in the list of family-
related keywords.
In a random sample of 200 tweets, 67% of the tweets
which contained one or more of these keywords referred to
people’s own family members.
Estimating the familial secondary attack rate
We make the following basic assumptions: First, a Twitter
user who has ILI may tweet about it. If she does, and if one of
her immediate families also develops ILI, there is some
probability that she will tweet about this fact as well. This
assumption is supported by previous work,15,16 which found
that it is possible to estimate influenza load from Twitter
messages about influenza.
Formally, we denote the familial SAR by PSAR, and the
probability that a user will report on a family member via her
Twitter feed by P(R). Given that a Twitter user has reported
suffering from ILI, the probability that he will report on a
family member suffering from ILI is given by:
PðReport [ Family member illÞ ¼ PSAR  PðRjILIÞ;
where P(R|ILI) is the probability of reporting on the health
of a family member conditioned on them suffering from ILI.
Our second assumption is that P(R|ILI)  P(R); that is,
the probability of reporting about ILI in a family member is
approximately the same as reporting on other aspects related
to the family member. We estimate P(R) for each user as the
ratio of their tweets mentioning a family member to the
number of all tweets they made, regardless of influenza.
A third assumption is that when both aTwitter user and their
family member have experienced ILI within a few days, it is
significantlymore likely that one of themhas infected the other,
than the likelihood that they were both infected independently.
Cases of the latter type may skew our estimate of fSAR.
Finally, we assume that if an ILI has been passed within a
household, it can take no more than several days to develop.
Here, we use a maximum of 7 days, as in Carcione et al. 5. If
a Twitter user and a family member are reported suffering
from ILI, but more than 7 days have passed between the two
reports, we will assume that the source for contagion was
different for the two individuals.
Under these assumptions, we can compute PSAR from a
population of users who reported suffering from ILI. We
denote whether user i from the population reporting ILI also
reported a family member suffering from ILI by Ti, where
Ti ¼ 1 if family member was reported with ILI
0 otherwise
n
:
From the above, we note that Ti~Bernoulli(PSAR  Pi(R)) for
each user. Given the population of users, the maximum
likelihood value ofPSAR can be estimated using linear regression
bhttp://royal.pingdom.com/2012/08/21/report-social-net-
work-demographics-in-2012/
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in the followingmannerc : LetTi andPi(R) be the corresponding
values for the ith user, where i = 1, 2, . . . N. We construct two
column vectors T = [Ti]i = 1. . .N and PR = [Pi(R)]i = 1. . .N.
Using the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse, the maximum
likelihood estimation of PSAR is given by:
PSAR ¼ ðPTR  PRÞ1  PTR  T:
In this work, we employ weighted linear regression,
weighting the data from each user according to the
probabilities found by the above-mentioned classifier. In
cases where users made several tweets referring to ILI
symptoms in themselves, we compute the maximum of the
probabilities assigned to these tweets. Similarly, we compute
the maximum of the probabilities in ILI tweets referring to
immediate family members. We used the maximum because
a single, highly explicit, tweet mentioning specific ILI could
indicate the fact that a person was ill (other methods for
determining the user weightings are also possible, but were
not investigated further). Then, we compute a confidence
score in the tweets of each user by averaging these two
probabilities (or take one, in cases where a user referred only
to themselves or their family members). We denote this
confidence by wi for the ith user and use it to weight the data
of each user. In a similar notation to the above, we construct
W, a diagonal matrix of size N9N, where the ith element of
the diagonal is equal to wi, then:
PSAR ¼ ðPTR W  PRÞ1  PTR W  T:
Estimating the familial serial interval
We measured the interval between the report of when a
Twitter user complained of ILI and when they reported that
their family member had ILI, for those users who reported on
both them and their family member suffering from ILI.
The familial serial interval (fSI) is the average of these
intervals.
Results
Performance of the classifier used to identify
specific ILI statements
The agreement between the labelers of the 1500 tweets
labeled using crowdsourcing was such that in 975% of
tweets, a majority of labelers agreed on the label. In 795%,
there was an agreement of 4 or more of the labelers.
We estimated the performance of the classifier using
50-fold cross-validation. The resulting receiver operating
curve (ROC) is shown in Figure 1. The area under the ROC
is 084, implying that classification of the tweets can be
considered relatively accurate. As noted above, we use the
classifier to weight the examples in the estimation of the
fSAR.
User survey
As noted above, we conducted a survey among Twitter users
and requested they report on whether they tweet about
family members, and, separately, whether, if one of their
family members is suspected of having the flu, would they
tweet about it. Among users who tweeted about family
matters, 83% reported they would tweet about a family
member having the flu.
This suggests our assumption that P(R|ILI)  P(R) is
likely correct, as the vast majority of users who tweet about
their family report their likelihood to tweet about a family
member with ILI.
Seasonal fSAR
Table 2 shows the number of users who mentioned ILI
symptoms. This table also shows the fSAR estimated for both
seasons. The fSAR for the 2013 season is approximately 23%
lower than that of the 2012 season. The 2013 season is known
to have been less severe than the 2012 season: Doctor visits
for ILI symptoms in England during the 2013 season were
lower than the 2012 season, peaking at 87 per 100 000,
compared to 327 for the 2012 season.17
Changes in fSAR over the influenza season
In the previous section, we reported the fSAR computed
from tweets collected over the entire influenza season. Here,
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Figure 1. Receiver operating curve (ROC) of the classifier to distinguish
personal from general tweets. The area under the ROC is 084.
cAn alternative estimation is to maximize the log-likeli-
hood of the product of two Bernoulli variables. Details are
provided in the Appendix A. Here, we use the linear
estimator which gives similar values, but allows the natural
addition of a weighting function, as detailed below.
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we report the fSAR computed from tweets reported during
2-week intervals over the influenza season. We compare these
to ILI rates reported by PHEd in each of these intervals. The
graphs for the two seasons are shown in Figure 2. In the 2012
season, fSAR clearly begins to increase in advance to ILI rates
do and appears simultaneous in the 2013 season, suggesting
that higher transmissibility causes an uptick in ILI rates.
Figure 3 compares estimated fSAR over time to virolog-
ically confirmed rates of influenza, as reported in the PHE
DataMart system,e a laboratory-based respiratory virus
surveillance system.18 The 2012 season was unusual in terms
of having an early wave of influenza B activity peaking at the
beginning of January 2013, and a later wave of influenza A
activity (mainly A(H3N2) but also some A(H1N1pdm2009))
peaking at the end of February. As the Figure shows, in the
2012 season, we observe a peak in fSAR closely timed with a
peak of influenza B in January, and a later peak in fSAR
overlapping a peak of influenza A activity in February. Peaks
in fSAR seem to be correlated with the initial rise in influenza
activities of each strain. Thus, the wave that peaks in
December is likely driven by the wave of influenza B activity,
and second peak is likely related to the influenza A wave. In
the 2013 season, there were low levels of ILI. A
(H1N1pdm2009) was the dominant strain which increased
from the end of 2013 to peak at the end of February 2014.
This likely relates to the peak of fSAR in January and
February 2014. Once more, this indicates that influenza A
had lower fSAR than that of influenza B.
These effects can be quantified using a regression model
where the independent variables are the changes (derivatives)
of the virological profiles and the dependent variable is fSAR.
We have empirically determined that a stronger correlation
appears for a quadratic form of fSAR, and these results are
reported here.
Table 3 shows the model parameters for each of the two
seasons. First, we note the high R2 values of both models,
which show that the models explain 34% and 45% of the
variance. Second, the dominant strain (influenza B in 2012
and influenza A in 2013) in each season is statistically
significantly correlated with fSAR. While only two seasons
are represented here, this suggests increased fSAR is corre-
lated with the beginning of a wave of influenza.
Familial serial interval
Familial SI, the average difference in time between reports of
ILI symptoms of a Twitter user and their family members (or
vice versa), was 241 days during the 2012 season, and 248
during the 2013 season (not statistically significant, rank sum
test). Thus, although fSAR differed significantly between
seasons, the time to infection did not.
Figure 4 compares estimated fSI over time to the number
of virologically confirmed cases of influenza in 2-week
Table 2. Familial secondary attack rate (fSAR) and data volumes for
the 2012 and 2013 seasons
Season
Number of users
reporting influenza-like
illnesses symptoms
Familial secondary
attack rate
2012 65 422 305% (SE 13%)
2013 93 459 257% (SE 08%)
Standard errors of fSAR estimate were computed using bootstrap
sampling with replacement.
Figure 2. Influenza-like illnesses (ILI) rates (per 100 000, dotted, left axis)
compared to the familial secondary attack rate probabilities (shown as a
full line, right axis) over the influenza season for the 2012 (top) and 2013
(bottom) seasons.
dhttps://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/weekly-
national-flu-reports
ehttps://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/weekly-
national-flu-reports
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intervals. In the 2012 season, fSI seems to increase around the
peak of the influenza B activity and increase before the peak
of influenza A activity. However, models similar to those
shown in Table 3 do not reach statistical significance,
indicating that additional factors beyond the virological
profiles may be influencing fSI. Further research is required
to understand these interactions and their effect on fSI.
Discussion
The familial secondary attack rate and the SI are important
parameters in understanding pandemic and seasonal influ-
enza. However, collecting data for these estimates can be
difficult, because of the need for continuous, large-scale
tracking of susceptible populations or prospective identifi-
cation and follow-up of cases and their contacts. Here, we
demonstrated the ability to compute fSAR and fSI from
social media.
Our work provides a repeatable method for assessing SAR
and SI of different strains of ILI including seasonal and
pandemic strains. This may be particularly important in
assessing the potential threat of new strains, which could be
identified through a sudden rise in fSAR or fSI. As we have
shown (Figures 2 and 3), such a rise appeared when a
less-familiar strain (Influenza B) appeared in the 2012
season. Understanding these parameters can help to inform
how health authorities need to intervene and is a component
to assessing severity of the threat of a new strain and changes
thereof.
Several previous studies attempted to estimate SAR and
fSAR. Recent examples of pandemic influenza include an
fSAR estimate for H1N1 of 76%19 and 113%.20 fSAR for the
H5N1 strain was estimated at 29%.21 In the 2009 epidemic of
H1N1, Carcione et al.5 estimated the fSAR of H1N1 in
Western Australia at 279%. For seasonal influenza, Carcione
et al.5 report fSAR is in the range of 10–40%, varying by
demography, location and season.5 We note that SAR has
different definitions, where a common one is the number of
secondary cases divided by the number of people other than
the index case (the first infected person in a family). Here, we
report the proportion of households that have at least one
secondary case. The difficulty in estimating the number of
people residing in a household necessitates the use of fSAR as
detailed in the Methods, but may cause the SAR estimation
reported here to be higher than that computed using other
definitions. We do not know of a published estimate for
fSAR in England during the two seasons reported in this
study. However, given past estimates, and the fact that the
average family size in the UK is 24,f our results of fSAR are
within the established range for this parameter. Other
evidence supports our estimate. First, the estimated fSAR
for the 2013 season was substantially lower than that of the
Figure 3. Estimated secondary attack rate compared to the number of
confirmed cases influenza A (all strains) and B, from Public Health England
data. The 2012–2013 season is shown on the top, and the 2013–2014
season on the bottom.
Table 3. Regression model between the slope of the virological
profiles and a quadratic familial secondary attack rate
Season
2012 2013
Influenza A coefficient 00008 00005*
Influenza B coefficient 00013* 00071
Adjusted model R2 045* 034*
Stars denote statistically significant results (P < 005).
fSee: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/family-demography/
families-and-households/2013/stb-families.html If each
household with a secondary case contains one index case,
the ratio of fSAR computed according to our estimate
compared to that computed in Carcione et al., 20115 is 1/1.4.
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2012 season, which fits with clinical findings for these
seasons.
Second, as our figures show, the fSAR associated with the
influenza B wave of the 2012 season was much higher than
the peak fSAR relating to influenza A in that year. Variations
in SAR may be driven by intrinsic diversity in viral
transmissibility, as well as variations in population suscep-
tibility. For example, in strains that have been in common
circulation in recent years, including both influenza A
(H1N1pdm2009) and influenza A(H3N2), high levels of
immunity and low corresponding SAR could be expected.
Conversely, population immunity to influenza B, which
rarely causes major outbreaks, may be low and SAR
correspondingly high.
Our findings of distinct peaks of SAR suggest that SAR is
not a constant factor but is a dynamic phenomenon that may
be driven by a combination of factors. For example, a
downward swing in SAR may reflect the accumulation of
immunity within the population through the course of an
outbreak. One of the major advantages of the proposed
method is the ability to rapidly estimate fSAR with a very low
effort and negligible cost. The dynamic nature of fSAR
necessitates this rapid estimation capability.
Our estimates of influenza SI (circa 25 days) are consis-
tent with those identified from prospective studies of
contacts of influenza.22 Here too, an additional advantage
of our methods is the ability to provide information on the
change in fSI throughout the season.
One of the causes for the overestimation of influenza rates
by Google Flu trends, an Internet-based surveillance system,
was media interest in influenza, which caused a people to
search more often for influenza-related information, skewing
its estimate for the number of people suffering from ILI.9 We
posit that the methods proposed here for the estimation of
fSAR and fSI are more immune to these errors, because a
heightened awareness and interest in influenza will similarly
affect the likelihood of reporting on both index and
secondary cases, thus leaving the estimates of fSAR and fSI
unaffected.
Future work will utilize other sources of Internet data,
including search engine queries and other social media, to
validate and improve the estimate for fSAR. Additionally,
targeted advertisements could be used to invite people
reporting ILI symptoms to provide samples for virological
testing, thus providing ground-truth data with minimal
delay.
Limitations
One limitation of our method pertains to the demographic
profile of Twitter users. Such users are not, currently,
representative of the population. For example, as noted in
the Methods section, fewer than 10% of users are under
18 years of age. As fSAR is known to vary with demography,
if a specific influenza strain affects, for example, children,
such strains may be underrepresented in the data and hence
bias our estimation. However, the variations in fSAR as a
function of demography are relatively small (e.g., between
125 and 163, as a function of household size5), these
differences should not, in general, cause a significant bias in
the estimate of fSAR.
Another potential bias of our method stems from the fact
that we do not have an explicit identification of the index case
versus those of the household contacts. Thus, if two members
of a household were independently infected (as can happen
when the infection rate is high), this may count as a secondary
attack, thus skewing our results. Previous researchers implic-
itly distinguished index cases from household cases according
to the timing of infection, for example, by not considering
cases with the same symptom onset.5 However, anecdotal
evidence suggests that some people refer to ILI in both them
and their family members in the same tweet.
Figure 4. Estimated serial interval compared to the number of confirmed
cases influenza A (all strains) and B, from Public Health England data. The
2012–2013 season is shown on the top, and the 2013–2014 season on
the bottom.
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Appendix A: Estimation of SAR using a
solution to the Bernoulli log-likelihood
function
As noted in Section “Changes in fSAR over the influenza
season”, Ti ~ Bernoulli(PSAR  Pi(R)) for each user. In that
section, we estimated using linear regression. An alternative
is to maximize the log-likelihood function of a Bernoulli
distribution, as follows: Let L(P) be the likelihood function
for a product of two Bernoulli variables, PSAR and Pi(R).
LðPÞ ¼
Y
T¼1
PSAR  PiðRÞ
Y
T¼0
ð1 PSAR  PiðRÞÞ:
The log-likelihood of L(P) can be maximized numerically
for a given set of data points.
Although the error criterion for linear regression and this
function differ, the results in practice are similar. Hence, we
opt for the use of linear regression, where weights of different
data points can be included naturally.
Yom-Tov et al.
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Appendix B: Changes in tweets related to
ILI over time
The figures show the percentage (over the season) of ILI-
related tweets referring to the posting user (self) or to family
members.
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